Conflict of Laws: Local Law Applied to Shareholders’ Rights in Foreign Corporation by unknown
NOTES
CONFLICT OF LAWS: LOCAL LAW APPLIED TO
SHAREHOLDERS' RIGHTS IN FOREIGN CORPORATION
THE California corporate securities law contains a provision, rare in
the field of state Blue Sky legislation, that the "sale" of a security in-
dudes any change in its rights and privileges' and that the Corporations
Commissioner is authorized to refuse a permit for a "sale" unless, in his
opinion, the proposed change is fair and equitable to all security holders
concerned.2
The question whether California could apply these provisions to a
foreign corporation was'presented in the recent case of Western Airlines
v. Sdbieski3 A minority group of stockholders exercised their charter
right of cumulative voting in a Delaware corporation which had its
principal place of business, as well as most of its assets and thirty per
cent of its stockholders, in California. Management then attempted to
amend the charter to eliminate the cumulative voting provisions. Cali-
fornia requires its domestic corporations to have cumulative voting,4 but
Delav~are does not.5 The Ciifornia Corporations Commissioner took
the positioni that the proposed amendment was a "sale," that it was
unfair" to a large number of California security holders, and that on
1 CAL. CORP. CODE § 25009.
"CAL. CoaP. CODE § 255o. These provisions are directed toward preventing
oppression of shareholders' rights after the corporation has been formed, in contrast
to the more traditional concern only with fair disclosure on the original sale. See
Orschel, Administrative Protection for Shareholders in California Recapitalizations,
4 SrAN. L. REV. 2i5, 2x8 (1952) ; Note, Protection for Shareholder Interests in Re-
capitalizations of .Publicly Held Cororations, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 1030, 1048 (.958).
The only similar statute allows a preferred shareholder to seek equitable relief against
unfair changes in priority rights, the burden of showing fairness being placed on the
proponents of the amendments. NEB. GEN. CoPds. LAW ch. 21, § 1162 (xg5i).
3 xz Cal. Rptr. 719 (596i). 4 CAL. CORP. CODE § 2235.
"DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 2x (x953). The Delaware statute merely permits
a corporation to have cumulative voting. The various state statutes are collected in
Note, xo8 U. OF PA. L. REV. 754, 755 (i96o).
' Fairness has been argued to hinge on the necessity for making a change in the
corporate structure and the' measure of compensation which shareholders will receive
for rights surrendered. Latty, Fairness-the Focal Point in Preferred Stock Arrearage
Elimination, 29 VA. L. Rxav. 1, 2 (194). Although well-reasoned arguments have
been made both for and against cumulative voting, compare Sobieski, In Support of
Cumulative Voting, a5 Bus. LAW. 316 (596o) 'with Sturdy, Mandatory Cumulative
Voting: An Anachronism, 16 Bus. LAw. 550 (196i), its summary elimination after
a stockholder fight has developed can hardly be described as either fair or justified by
the management's desire to be unhampered by minority shareholder representation on
the board of directors.
this issue the fiction of the plaintiff's Delaware residence should yield
to the totality of California contacts so as to require his approval as a
condition to eliminating the right of cumulative voting by the share-
holders. In an action by the corporation against the Commissioner the
trial court held that because the amendment of the articles of incorpora-
tion was an "internal affair" between the foreign corporation and its
shareholders, the Commissioner had exceeded his jurisdiction. The
District Court of Appeal reversed, however, reasoning that a state could
regulate such a change to protect its residents. Although the corpora-
tion emphatically contended that the California legislature had* repealed
a provision requiring foreign corporations to have cumulative voting,
the court held that the legislature had granted the Commissioner the
power to appraise the fairness of changes in the corporate structures of
foreign as well as domestic corporations. Finally, the court concluded
that the Commissioner's action was not unconstitutional because the
foreign corporation did a substantial amount of business within Cali-
fornia.
Western' Airlines focuses attention on the familiar corporate prac-
tice of incorporating in states with less stringent laws and then operating
the entire business in one or more states that could be a continent away,
as in the instant case. Such corporations have come to be known as
pseudo-foreign or migratory corporations.' A large body of law has
grown up involving shareholder suits against foreign corporations,'
and it was these analogous precedents on which the trial court in
Western Airlines relied. The general rule has been said to be that
courts will not take jurisdiction of a suit involving the internal affairs
of a foreign corporation, nor, in the exercise of visitorial powers, inter-
fere with the management of a foreign corporation.9 Unfortunately,
however, this rule has been applied broadly to both pseudo-foreign and
See Latty, Pseudo-Foreign Corporations, 65 YA E L.J. 137 (1955).
8See generally 17 FLETCHER, CORPORArOS §§ 8475-8445.1 (rev. ed. 196o).
0 Id. at § 8425; Annot., 8 A.L.R.2d 1185 (1949). A leading ease defining an
"internal affair" is North State Copper and Gold Mining Co. v. Field, 64 Md. xSx,
2o At. 1039 (x885).
The usual function of the internal affairs rule in shareholder suits is to relegate
the dissident shareholder to the state of incorporation to assert his rights. The possi-
bility of harsh results has led many courts to the obviously contrived conclusion that
a particular controversy did not involve an internal affair. Compare Andrews v.
Mines Corp., 2o5 Mass. zxz, 91 N.E. 122 (igo) with In re Rappleye, 43 App. Div.
84, 59 N.Y.S. 338 (1899). Few courts have articulated their underlying thinking in
terms of convenience and public policy. The best solution to the problem seems to
lie in legislation such as N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-133(a) (596o), which states that an
action shall not be dismissed solely on the ground that it involves the internal affairs
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true foreign corporations alike, with little consideration of whether a
decree rendered by the court could actually be enforced.10 Early de-
cisions asserted that the suits could not be entertained because of a lack
of jurisdiction," but later cases considered the question a matter of
discretion only.1 2  In suits brought by shareholders, most courts now
would view the rule as merely one of forum non conveniens.' 3
If the foreign state takes jurisdiction of "internal affairs" litigation,
the traditional conflict-of-laws rule requires that the law of the in-
corporating state be applied to the controversy.' 4 Delaware is the only
jurisdiction whose courts have dearly upheld a charter amendment
eliminating cumulative voting,'5 although the statutory language in
many other states seems at least equally permissive.' If the California
Corporations Commissioner in asserting jurisdiction to challenge the
proposed amendment in Western Airlines had measured its legality by
Delaware law, the elimination of cumulative voting would have been
valid. This result would have frustrated a clear legislative mandate
to the Commissioner to measure all changes by their "fairness." How-
ever, the Commissioner interpreted the "fairness" test to mean that on
this issue he could apply California law to the Delaware corporation to
of a foreign cdrporation. Dismissal is permitted only when more adequate relief
can be had elsewhere, or when the convenience of the parties so requires.
1o Compare Kelly v. Thomas, 234 Pa. 419, 83 Atl. 307 (i912) (large amount of
corporate assets within jurisdiction is sufficient guarantee of effectiveness of decree) with
Sprague v. Universal Voting Machine Co., 134 Ill. App. 379 (1907) (jurisdiction
denied).
"See, e.g. Howell v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 51 Barb. (N.Y.) 378 (1868). The
internal affairs rule is also justified on two other grounds: (1) the inadvisability of
interpreting the law of the domiciliary state. Hogue v. American Steel Foundries, 247
Pa. 2, 92 At. 1073 (1915); (2) the desirability of avoiding a possible conflict of
decisions. Sauerbrunn v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 22o N.Y. 363, 115 N.E. 1oo1
(1917); cf. Guilford v. Western Union Tel. Co., 59 Minn. 332, 6x N.W. 324
(1894) (possible conflict merely "one of the necessary imperfections in the admin-
istration of justice").
"
2 Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., 288 U.S. 123 (1933)i see cases in Note, x8
MINN. L. REV, 192, 195 at n.1 7 0933).
"1Koster v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518 (i947)5 Note, Forum
Non Conveniens as a Substitute for the Internal Affairs Rule, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 234
(958).
4 RESTATEMENT, CONFLICTS § 197 (1934).
" Maddock v. Vorclone Corp., 17 Del. Ch. 39, 147 AtI. 255 (1929); cf. Quilliam
v. Hebronville Utilities Inc., 241 S.W.2d 225 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951) (change partly
justified under "business judgment?' rule). Other states have not allowed such an
amendment. Wright v. Central Cal. Colony Water Co., 67 Cal. 532, 8 Pac. 70
(x885); Tomlin v. Farmers & Merchants Bank, 5z Mo. App. 430 (1893); Lowenthal
v. Rubber Reclaiming Co., 52 N.J. Eq. 44o, 28 At. 454 (1894).
"See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14:11 (195s).
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protect California shareholders, and this choice of law was upheld by the
District Court of Appeal. One scholar argues that there is no consti-
tutional prohibition against courts in conflict-of-laws cases looking as a
matter of course to the law of the forum for the governing rule, and
then applying local law if there is a particular policy to be served.1 7
There is little doubt of the soundness of Western Airlines under this
conflict-of-laws standard, for the subject matter of the controversy was
strongly related to the governmental policy of the forum. 8
Western Airlines certainly does not indicate, however, that all
foreign corporations must have cumulative voting in order to sell shares
or do business in California. The court made it clear that the Com-
missioner's power of appraisal was a flexible one,1 implying that
California neither could nor should exert such veto power over a foreign
corporation having little contact with the state.?
If a state wishes to undertake a reasonable regulation of changes in
the corporate structure, no good reason exists why this policy should
be thwarted by an essentially domestic corporation through the simple
process of incorporating in another state. Judicial utterances to the
effect that corporations are the creature of the incorporating state and
te powers granted them by those states are the same elsewhere as at
home2' have no place.in the modern business world. Most modem
courts have had little difficulty recognizing the "pseudo-foreign" corpo-
ration in shareholder litigation when strong local considerations were
involved.2 2 . The New York legislature has gone one step further and
11 Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmental Interests and
the Judicial Function, 26 U. CaI. L. REv. 9 (1958). Prof. Currie vigorously opposes
any nation that a court should balance respective state policies. See Hill, Governental
Interests and the Conflict of Laws-A Reply to Professor Currie, 27 U. OF Cal. L.
REV. 463 (196o).
"2 "Nothing in the Constitution requires a state to nullify its own protective stand-
ards because an enterprise regulated has its headquarters elsewhere." Hoopeston
Canning Co. v. Cullen, 318 U.S. 313, 320 (-943).
19 z2 Cal. Rptr. at 728.
-. " Thus viewed, the decision accords with one scholar's argument that local corpora-
tion law should be applied to foreign corporations on a selective basis. "A sharp
eye for the predominantly local interests would lead to using the term pseudo-foreign
corporation' as merely a shorthand expression for summarizing the presence of those
local interests pertinent to the specific issue in question." Latty, supra note 7 at
161.
21Boyette v. Preston Motors Corp., 2o6 Ala. z40 89 So. 746 (1921). Cf.
Arkansas-Louisiana Elec. Co.-Op. v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 21o Ark. 84, 194
S.W.2d 673 (1946) (entrance conditional upon acceptance of local law).
2 See, e.g., Toklan Royalty Corp. v. Tiffany, 193 Okla xlo, 141 P.zd 57!
(1943) (corporation not "foreign" with respect to stockholder examination of records
within the jurisdiction).
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defined a "domiciled foreign corporation" in order to delineate accurate-
ly the limits of that state's new corporation law's applicability to foreign
corporations.23
Western Airlines emphasizes the growing tendency of states to apply
their own law to the "internal affairs" of foreign corporations which are
more closely identified with that state than with any other. The
United States Supreme Court will undoubtedly permit this trend to
continue, perhaps beyond the pseudo-foreign situation, just as it has
allowed states to proportionately tax interstate corporate revenues,24
and subject foreign corporations to local suit if they are "doing business"
there. 5
Reappraisal of supposedly settled doctrines will be essential for the
interstate corporation. For in§tance, the general rule is that legality of
dividend payments is to be measured by the law of the domiciliary
state. 6 If a foreign corporation conducts most of its operations in a
state other than that of its incorporation, Western Airlines suggests
that the dividend law of the latter forum could be appliedVT One
case has already come to this conclusion.28
A more vexing question is posed by a true "interstate" corporation,
one, for example, that conducts a third of its business in the state of
29 A foreign corporation is domiciled if: (i) at least two-thirds of all its out-
standing shares, with or without voting rights, are owned, either beneficially or of
record, by residents of New York; or (2) at least two-thirds of all its outstanding
shares with voting rights are owned, either beneficially or of record, by residents of
New York; or (3) at least two-thirds of its business income or its investment income
is allocable to New York for franchise tax purposes under the state tax law. Bus.
CoRP. LAW § 1317 (to take effect April 1, 1963). Only one other state seems to have
considered such a statute. Latty, Powers & Breckenridge, The Proposed North
Carolina Business Corporation Act, 33 N.C.L. REv. 26 (1954), discusses N.C.S. Bill
N. 49, the pseudo-foreign corporation provisions of which were not enacted. The pro-
posed definition of a pseudo-foreign corporation was "a foreign corporation .. .which
engages in no substantial business activity in the state of its incorporation, and which,
by virtue of the place and character of its business and personnel, is more closely
identified with the business life of North Carolina than with that of any other state."
33 N.C.L. REv. at 52.
2 4 Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959)-
"'McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (x957). See Kurland, The
Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and the In Personam Jurisdiction of State
Courts, z5 U. oF Cal. L. REV. 569 (1958).
28 FLMCHER, CORPORATIONS § 5334 (rev. ed. 1958).
"27Accord, Latty, supra note 7 at 14o Coleman, Corporate Dividends and the
Conflict of Laws, 63 HAav. L. REV. 433 (1950).
"SInternational Ticket Scale Corp. v. United States, 16s F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1948)
(federal tax case). Cf. Irving Trust Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 83 F.2d 168 (2d
Cir. 1936) (opinion by L. Hand, J.).
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incorporation, State A, and has its offices there, but has equal contact
with State B, a state with more stringent dividend restrictions than
the domiciliary state. If the dividend's legality were litigated in State
B, no valid constitutional objections could be raised to State B's prefer-
ence of its own law to that of the domiciliary state. The United States
Supreme Court has held that the full faith and credit clause does not
require a state, when it has legitimate interests to protect, to subordinate
its own law to that of another state." That Court has also said that a
state could, for the protection of its citizens, regulate to some degree
the distribution of dividends by a foreign corporation headquartered
elsewhere, at least with respect to money earned in the regulating
state.30 If Western Airlines is extended to apply to the interstate
corporation's "internal affairs," some initial confusion will doubtless
result.31 However, the benefits to be gained by allowing states to
enforce strong local policies for the protection of its citizens dearly
outweigh the certainty of application of lax corporation laws.
The broader implications of Western Airlines seem far-reaching.
The decision dearly will cause pseudo-foreign corporations to re-
appraise the merits of foreign incorporation. If the choice-of-law
principle implicit in Western Airlines were carried to its logical con-
dusion,32 a state would be able to impose regulatory control whenever
a foreign corporation's contacts with that state were sufficient. As a
result, states, given comprehensive regulatory control over both do-
,mestic and.foreign corporations, might further examine the evils long
intrinsic in corporate reorganization and recapitalization. But what-
ever effect Western Airlines may have on regulatory aspects of corpo-
ration law, the California court's rejection of the internal affairs rule
joins other well-reasoned decisions33 and New York legislation in
formulating a sensible approach to the problem of which state's law is
applicable to pseudo-foreign corporations.
" Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935). See
also cases cited in Note, 42 CoLumv. L. REv. 689, 691 at n. 9 (1942); Currie, supra
note 17 at 19-30.
" International Harvester Co. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Taxation, 3'22 U.S. 435, 442
(1944) (dictum). "Even if the prohibited act is done in the home state [of a foreign
corporation] it may be so bound up in its results with the business in this state that
we cannot view it with indifference." German-American Coffee Co. v. Diehl, 2%6
N.Y. 57, 64, 1o9 N.E. 875, 877 (i915) (dictum by Cardozo, J.).
81 Coleman, supra note 27, makes an unconvincing argument against any such
extension.
82 See Currie, note S7 supra at 79-80. But compare Latty, supra note 7 at 141.
' See, e.g. State ex rel. Weede v. Iowa So. Util. Co. of Del., 231 Iowa 784, a
N.W.2d 372 (1942); cases cited in Note, 196o DUKE L.J. 477, 480.
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